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TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS THROUGH A 
BACKDOOR IN THE VIRGINIA CODE: ADOPTIONS 
UNDER SECTION 63.2-1202(H) 
Dale Margolin Cecka * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under private adoption law in Virginia, a parent can lose her 
parental rights in one court hearing based on a single petition, 
without any proof of parental unfitness offered, and without the 
opportunity to object to the adoption of her child. Virginia Code 
section 63.2-1202(H), pertaining to adoptions where the petitioner 
is a private party and the consent of the parent is not required, is 
so streamlined that it can violate the constitutional rights of both 
biological parents and their children. In 2012, the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly added more specific language to the statute, but on 
its face, it is still inadequate to protect the rights of a parent and 
the best interests of the child.1 
A mother is convicted on narcotics charges and receives a ten-
year sentence that will likely be reduced for good behavior. 2 In 
anticipation of her incarceration, she gives custody of her three-
year-old child, who she has cared for since birth, to the child's 
aunt. The mother asks the aunt to bring the child to the prison 
for regular visits, but the aunt feels that bringing a young child to 
prison is inappropriate, even though the prison has a mother-
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Jeanette Lipman Family 
Law Clinic, University of Richmond School of Law. J.D., 2004, Columbia Law School; B.A., 
1999, Stanford University. 
1. Act of Mar. 30, 2012, ch. 424, 2012 Va. Acts 721, 726 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012)). 
2. The following facts are based off of a case currently being handled by the Jeanette 
Lipman Family Law Clinic at the University of Richmond School of Law ("Family Law 
Clinic") (on file with author). After the guardian ad !item's ("GAL") appearance, the GAL 
contacted the Family Law Clinic for assistance. The clinic took over representation in 2010 
and eventually the petitioner withdrew the adoption petition. In June 2013, the petitioner 
filed a new adoption petition in a different circuit court. The Family Law Clinic is now 
seeking appointment as counsel on that petition. 
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child visiting program. The aunt also lives a great distance from 
the prison and lacks the resource to make frequent trips. 
Relations between the mother and aunt deteriorate. The moth-
er is only able to communicate with the aunt and child through 
letters, but the aunt neither gives the child the letters nor writes 
reply letters to the mother. Eventually the mother stops sending 
mail except for Christmas and the child's birthday. 
Three years pass and the aunt decides to adopt the now six-
year-old child. The aunt is partly motivated to adopt the child to 
increase her social security benefits. She visits the mother in 
prison, without bringing the child, and asks the mother to con-
sent to the adoption. The mother denies consent. Nevertheless, 
the aunt files for adoption, pleading that the mother's consent is 
not necessary because of the mother's failure to visit or communi-
cate with the child in the prior six months. Because the mother is 
incarcerated, the court appoints a guardian ad litem ("GAL") to 
represent the mother's interests.3 The GAL visits the mother once 
and learns that the mother never received notice of the adoption 
petition or the hearing date, that she has tried to visit the child, 
and that she has sent countless letters, but none in the last six 
months. The GAL appears via telephone on the mother's behalf 
on the hearing date. Based on his limited knowledge of the case, 
he attempts to explain the mother's position while acting in his 
role as a GAL, not as the mother's advocate. The court grants one 
continuance so the GAL can gather more information and file a 
written report. 
Perhaps adoption is best in the long run for this child and this 
family. Family law is, after all, exceedingly complicated; there are 
no easy answers and, in many cases, every party experiences loss. 
Furthermore, the ultimate determining factor-the best interest 
of the child-is a moving and highly subjective target, but Virgin-
ia Code section 63.2-1202(H) does not account for this subjective 
nature. 4 As written and practiced, section 1202(H) allows a court 
to sever all ties between parent and child, without the parent ev-
er appearing in court. 5 Even when the parent does appear, it may 
3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-223 (Repl. Vol. 2013); id. § 8.01-9 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & 
Cum. Supp. 2013). 
4. See id.§ 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (failing to even mention "the best interest 
of the child"). 
5. See id. § 63.2-1202(H), (J) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
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be without a court appointed attorney and without the statutory 
grounds to properly defend herself.6 The factual scenario de-
scribed above is real and not uncommon. The application of sec-
tion 1202(H) illustrates the principle that bad law makes bad 
cases. 
There are both substantive and procedural due process issues 
with this code section. It runs afoul of equal protection; parents 
whose rights are terminated through the private adoption system 
are treated wholly differently than those whose rights are termi-
nated through government intervention. Additionally, conflicts of 
interest abound when private parties can terminate parental 
rights through section 1202(H). This article explores deficits in 
the statute, in light of constitutional law, other Virginia adoption 
and termination of parental rights statutes, and other states' 
codes and jurisprudence. Part II describes the history and prac-
tice of the statute. Part III describes the flaws of the statute, in-
cluding Fourteenth Amendment violations and inherent conflicts 
of interest. Part IV calls for the revision of section 1202(H) based 
on recent precedent in which the Supreme Court of Virginia rec-
ognized the sanctity of the parent-child relationship and the 
state's interest in preserving it. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CASE LAW 
A. Section 63.2-1202 
Virginia Code section 63.2-1202, which establishes general 
provisions regarding parental consent in all adoptions, was origi-
nally enacted in 1950.7 Adoptions under this statute require the 
consent of natural birth parents unless a statutory provision dic-
tates otherwise.8 This article will refer to adoptions under section 
1202(H) as "private" adoptions because section 1202(H) applies 
when the petitioner is a private citizen, not the state's social ser-
6. Id. § 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (recognizing a parent's due process right of 
notice and the right to be heard in court on the issue of abandonment); id. § 63.2-1233 
(Repl. Vol. 2012) (giving the court discretion to appoint legal counsel for a birth parent); 
see Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (noting 
that an indigent's right to appointed counsel exists only where the litigant "may lose his 
physical liberty''). 
7. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 63.2-1202 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
8. Id.§ 63.2-1202(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
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vices agency.9 In petitions for private adoptions, the court may 
terminate the birth parent's custodial rights at the same time 
that the adoption is granted. 10 
In 2006, the General Assembly added section 1202(H), which 
created an exception to the statutory requirement to obtain pa-
rental consent. 11 Section 1202(H) obviates the need for the con-
sent of natural parents in cases where a parent has failed to "vis-
it" or "contact" her child for a period of six months prior to the 
adoption petition filing. 12 The statute amounts this failure to visit 
or contact her child to an allegation of "abandonment."13 In 2012, 
the General Assembly adopted two additions to section 1202(H) 
under H.B. 445. 14 The full section is quoted below, with these ad-
ditions in italics. 
No consent shall be required of a birth parent who, without just 
cause, has neither visited nor contacted the child for a period of six 
months immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption or 
the filing of a petition to accept consent to an adoption. The prospec-
tive adoptive parent(s) shall establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the birth parent(s), without just cause, has neither visited 
nor contacted the child for a period of six months immediately prior 
to the filing of the petition for adoption or the filing of a petition to 
accept consent to an adoption. This provision shall not infringe upon 
the birth parent's right to be noticed and heard on the allegation of 
abandonment. For purposes of this section, the payment of child 
support, in the absence of other contact with the child, shall not be 
considered contact. 15 
H.B. 445, which took two years to move forward, "did not come 
from any particular case or incident that arose during an adop-
9. In contrast to "private" adoptions, "public" adoptions involve children who have 
been taken from their birth parents and placed in the custody of the state, usually because 
of allegations of abuse or neglect. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(l)--{2) (Cum. Supp. 
2013). Eventually, if the child's safe return to his birth parents is not feasible, the state 
may file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the parents and free the child for 
adoption. See id.§ 16.1-283(A}, (B)(1H2) (Repl. Vol. 2010). 
10. See id.§§ 63.2-1202, -1233(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
11. Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 848, 2006 Va. Acts 1328, 1330 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 63.2-1202(H) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
12. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
13. Id. 
14. H.B. 445, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2012) (enacted as Act of Mar. 30, 2012, 
ch. 424, 2012 Va. Acts 721, 726). 
15. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1202 (Repl. Vol. 2012). The General Assembly had 
previously added the last sentence regarding the payment of child support in 2009 with 
H.B. 2159. H.B. 2159, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Apr. 8, 2009, 
ch. 805, 2009 Va. Acts 2431, 2432). 
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tion proceedingsQ," according to its sponsor, Delegate Toscano. 16 
It emanated instead from a general legislative concern about the 
ambiguity of section 63.2-1202. 11 The purpose of H.B. 445 was to 
clarify for the courts when they could allow an adoption to go for-
ward without gaining consent from a birth parent.18 
Prior to the enactment of section 1202(H) in 2006, courts 
looked to indicia beyond mere visitation frequency to determine 
whether "abandonment" had occurred in the private adoption 
context.19 Since 2006, only a handful of cases involving section 
1202(H) have reached the appellate level.20 These decisions fail to 
establish a clear standard for abandonment under section 
1202(H).21 In Campos v. Hinsch, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
did not address the issue of abandonment but ruled that consent 
was unnecessary from an incarcerated father who failed to ap-
pear at the adoption hearing.22 In Hughes v. Hughes, the trial 
court established abandonment based in part on a home study 
conducted to determine whether the adoptive parents could ade-
quately parent the child.23 It is not clear how a study of the adop-
tive parent's home could support the claim the birth mother had 
abandoned her child, but apparently the court was satisfied that 
the mother had abandoned her child pursuant to section 
1202(H).24 Hughes contrasts, however, with Gibson v. Kappel, a 
16. E-mail from Carmen Bingham, Chief of Staff to Delegate David Toscano to Zacha-
ry Jesse, Research Assistant for author (June 12, 2013, 5:00 PM) (on file with author). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., Robinette v. Keene, 2 Va. App. 578, 584-86, 347 S.E.2d 156, 160-61, 
(1986) (looking at the overall picture of parental involvement and fitness rather than only 
a specific period of no contact with the child). 
20. See, e.g., Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 715 S.E.2d 11 (2011); Campos v. Hinsch, 
No. 2465-10-1, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 313 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2011) (unpublished deci-
sion); Hughes v. Hughes, No. 1530-10-1, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 85 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 
2011) (unpublished decision); Todd v. Copeland, 55 Va. App. 773, 689 S.E.2d 784 (2010). 
21. See Copeland, 282 Va. at 189, 715 S.E.2d at 14; Campos, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 
313, at *2; Hughes, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 85, at *5. 
22. Campos, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 313, at *1-8; see VA. CODE ANN.§§ 63.2-1202(J), 
-1233(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2013), at *1-8. The trial court specifically held 
that the appellant's consent was not required pursuant to Virginia Code section 63.2-
1202(J) because the incarcerated appellant failed to appear at the hearing on the petition 
after notice (notwithstanding his incarceration). Id. at *1-5. Furthermore, if consent was 
required, it was being withheld contrary to the best interests of the child pursuant to Vir-
ginia Code section 63.2-1233(2). Id. at *4; see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1233(2) (Repl. Vol. 
2012 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
23. Hughes, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 85, at *3-5. 
24. See id. at *3-5. While the appellate decision does not illustrate what "other evi-
dence" the court used to establish abandonment, it does note the following facts: the child 
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subsequent 2011 unpublished custody decision, which explained 
that mere entrustment of a child to another does not constitute 
abandonment, even if the parent abdicates parental responsibili-
ties.25 
The most significant case interpreting section 1202(H) is the 
well-known Copeland v. Todd. 26 The mother, Leslie Todd, rarely 
saw her child over the course of two years, including a period of 
one year with entirely no contact. 21 Near the end of the two-year 
period, the foster parent, Lucretia Copeland, requested the moth-
er's consent to adopt the child.28 The mother denied consent and 
her interest in her child was renewed. 29 After the foster parent re-
fused the mother's request for frequent visitations, the mother 
sought and received court-ordered visitation rights.30 After these 
visitation rights were established and acted upon, the foster par-
ent petitioned to adopt the child and cited section 1202(H) as ob-
viating the need for the mother's consent.31 The trial court grant-
ed the adoption-finding the period of no contact between June 
2006 and June 2007 sufficient to obviate consent under section 
1202(H) because the mother had not visited the children for a pe-
riod of six months-as well as holding that the mother had with-
held her consent to the adoption contrary to the best interests of 
the child pursuant to sections 63.2-1203 and 63.2-1205.32 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court's rul-
ing on the issue of the period of no contact under section 1202(H), 
holding that the statutory language, "prior to" the adoption, 
was born with narcotics in her system and removed from the mother's custody shortly af-
ter birth; the juvenile and domestic relations ("JDR") court found that the mother and bio-
logical father were withholding consent to the adoption contrary to the child's best inter-
ests; and the mother failed to appear at the consolidated trial of her appeal of the JDR 
court's order and the adoptive parent's petition. Id. at *1-5. 
25. See Gibson v. Kappel, No. 0180-11-4, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 352, at *9 (Va. Ct. App. 
Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished decision). In this case, which was a custody dispute, not an 
adoption case, the court did not dispute the trial court's finding that "[n]either parent has 
voluntarily relinquished parental rights, nor abandoned the child, though each has clearly 
abdicated responsibility for the day-to-day care of the child." Id. 
26. 282 Va. 183, 715 S.E.2d 11 (2011). 
27. Id. at 188, 715 S.E.2d at 14. 
28. Id. 
29. See id. 
30. Id. at 188-89, 715 S.E.2d at 14. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 189--90, 715 S.E.2d at 14-15; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-1203, -1205 
(Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013). Virginia Code sections 63.2-1203 and 63.2-1205 are dis-
cussed further in Part II.B. 
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meant the time immediately prior to the adoption petition. 33 The 
Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the court of appeals' interpre-
tation.34 In addition, the supreme court rejected the foster moth-
er's argument that the contact between the birth parent and child 
must consist of a "meaningful or significant visitation," holding 
that "this interpretation goes beyond the plain meaning of the 
statute and would require courts to evaluate the quality and val-
ue of time spent between a birth parent and child."35 
The plain language argument the court embraced allows for 
many inferences. Perhaps the court did not think it was its duty 
to make judgment calls about the nature of the contact.36 Maybe 
the court viewed section 1202(H) as designed to obviate consent 
based solely on a specific time period without parental contact.37 
For whatever reason, the court grasped on to the plain language 
of section 1202(H). The problem is that even with the 2012 statu-
tory amendments, the plain language of section 1202(H) is am-
biguous, procedurally and substantively problematic, and subject 
to misuse and misinterpretation. 
B. Section 63.2-1205 
Copeland u. Todd is better known for its holding regarding the 
constitutionality of Virginia Code sections 63.2-1205 and 63.2-
1203, by which a court may grant a private adoption even if the 
natural parent withholds consent if the court finds that consent is 
withheld contrary to the best interests of the child.38 Copeland is 
the only case where the Supreme Court of Virginia has ruled on 
the constitutionality of Virginia's private adoption law.39 There-
fore, its reasoning and holding on constitutional questions should 
be applied to section 1202(H). 
33. Todd v. Copeland, 55 Va. App. 773, 792-93, 689 S.E.2d 784, 794 (2010); see VA. 
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
34. Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 194, 715 S.E.2d 11, 17 (2011). 
35. Id. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-1205, -1203 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013). While section 
62.3-1203 is the code section that actually allows for the adoption to proceed without pa-
rental consent when it is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child, section 62.3-
1205 provides the standards for determining when this situation actually exists. See id.; 
Copeland, 282 Va. at 197-201, 715 S.E.2d at 18-21. 
39. See Copeland, 282 Va. at 197, 715 S.E.2d at 18. 
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To understand the constitutional question presented to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia in Copeland, it is important to outline 
the history of section 63.2-1205. As discussed, consent is neces-
sary to execute parental placement (private) adoptions, unless 
consent is trumped by another statutory provision, like section 
1202(H).40 Besides section 1202(H), the other significant statute 
which obviates parental consent, and is the subject of most appel-
late litigation regarding parental consent, is section 63.2-1205.41 
Section 63.2-1205 dates back to 1995.42 The Virginia General 
Assembly drafted the statute to read, "In determining whether 
the valid consent of any person whose consent is required is 
withheld contrary to the best interests of the child . . . the 
court shall consider whether the failure to grant the petition for 
adoption would be detrimental to the child."43 The requirement to 
consider "detriment" to the child reflected the extensive constitu-
tional jurisprudence, both by the Supreme Court of the United 
States and by the Supreme Court of Virginia, defining the scope 
of parental rights encompassed by the privacy rights implied in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 44 The General Assembly's use of the 
phrase "detrimental to the child" in the initial statute setting the 
standards for determining the ''best interests of the child" forced 
the circuit courts to make specific factual findings of detriment 
(or harm) to a child in order to justifiably pierce the privacy in-
terests of the parents.45 
The "detriment" language remained in the statute until the 
General Assembly made a substantive change in 2006. Since 
2006, the statute has read, "In determining whether the valid 
consent of any person whose consent is required is withheld con-
trary to the best interests of the child . . . the circuit court ... 
40. See supra note 4-5 and accompanying text. 
41. VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1205 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013). 
42. See Act of Apr. 6, 1995, ch. 772, 1995 Va. Acts 1414, 1438 (codified at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 63.1-225.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995)); Copeland, 282 Va. at 195, 715 S.E.2d at 18 (explain-
ing that the detriment to the child standard was initially codified in Virginia Code section 
63.1-225.1). 
43. Ch. 772, 1995 Va. Acts at 1438 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.1-225.1 (Repl. Vol. 
1995)). 
44. See infra Part III. 
45. See ch. 772, 1995 Va. Acts at 1438 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225.1 (Repl. 
Vol. 1995)). Detriment and harm are used interchangeably by the courts in section 63.2-
1205 cases. See, e.g., Copeland, 282 Va. at 198-99, 715 S.E.2d at 19-20; Doe v. Doe, 222 
Va. 736, 747, 284 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1981). 
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shall consider whether granting the petition pending before it 
would be in the best interest of the child."46 
In Copeland, when faced with the question of whether the post-
2006 statute is constitutional, the Supreme Court of Virginia first 
acknowledged the history of section 63.2-1205 and its judicial in-
terpretation.47 The court noted that in the absence of a standard 
in the pre-1995 statute, the court "developed the 'detriment to the 
child' standard [in addition to the 'best interests' analysis] in or-
cler to balance the child's best interests with the constitutional 
rights of the biological parents."48 While the General Assembly 
codified the "detriment" standard into section 63.2-1205 in 1995, 
it subsequently excised the language when revamping the adop-
tion sections of the Code of Virginia in 2006 and increased its fo-
cus on the ''best interests of the child."49 
Notwithstanding this seemingly unambiguous change, the 
court opined that there existed a need to analyze whether termi-
nation of parental rights would result in detriment to the child, in 
addition to inquiring into the child's best interests.50 It noted that 
a ''best interest" analysis could not suffice by itself because 
if a mere finding of promotion is all that is required to determine 
that the birth parent's consent is withheld contrary to the child's 
best interests, a court effectively could divest a natural parent of all 
rights and obligations with respect to the child simply by finding 
that placement in the prospective adoptive home is more suitable to 
the child than placement with the birth parent. 51 
The court reinforced this conclusion by citing to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, which has emphasized that a natural 
parent has due process rights relating to her relationship with 
46. Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 848, 2006 Va. Acts 1328, 1330 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1205 (Cum. Supp. 2006)); Act of Apr. 7, 2006, ch. 825, 2006, Va. Acts 
1262, 1267-68 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1205 (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
47. Copeland, 282 Va. at 195-97, 715 S.E.2d at 17-18. 
48. Id., 715 S.E.2d at 17. 
49. Id., 715 S.E.2d at 17-18 ("Therefore, although the General Assembly retained the 
factors previously required to determine whether the failure to grant the petition for adop-
tion would be detrimental to the child, they are now factors relevant to determining 
whether consent is withheld contrary to the 'best interests of the child."'); see Act of Apr. 9, 
2005, ch. 848, 2006 Va. Acts. 1328, 1330 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-
1205 (Cum. Supp. 2006)); Act of Apr. 7, 2005, ch. 825, 2006 Va. Acts 1262, 1267-68 (codi-
fied as amended at VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1205 (Cum. Supp. 2006)); Act of Apr. 6, 1995, ch. 
772, 1995 Va. Acts 1414, 1438 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.1-225.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). 
50. Copeland, 282 Va. at 199, 715 S.E.2d at 20. 
51. Id. at 197-98, 715 S.E.2d at 19. 
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the child, which cannot be severed by a mere showing that termi-
nation of those rights would be in the best interests of the child.52 
The court held that the absence of the "detriment" language in 
the statute was not fatal to the statute's constitutionality, so long 
as the statute provides for consideration of parental fitness and 
detriment to the child.53 The trial court must give consideration 
beyond whether the granting of the adoption is in the child's best 
interest-it must consider factors which protect a parent's due 
process rights. 54 The court found that the eight factors set forth in 
section 63.2-1205 help the statute pass constitutional muster be-
cause they compel the trial court to consider the fitness of the 
parent and the harm to the child, which is what is constitutional-
ly required of the statute. 55 The court found that the trial court 
performed the overarching analysis of the fitness of the parent 
that the statute demands.56 The court concluded, "[T]he Virginia 
Code's adoption statutes meet constitutional due process scrutiny 
because they encompass far more than mere consideration of the 
child's best interests as defined in cases involving a contest be-
tween natural parents."57 
The court bolstered its conclusion by distinguishing the term 
''best interests of the child" in this particular application from 
other instances of the phrase in the Virginia Code. 58 The court 
noted that, while the phrase ''best interests of the child" was ger-
mane to custody proceedings in a divorce context, the relative def-
inition this term carried was not the same in the context of adop-
tions. 59 Here, in a termination of parental rights proceeding, the 
phrase took on weightier meaning as a result of the due process 
considerations of the natural parents.60 The court concluded that 
the trial court "went beyond whether the adoption ... would be in 
the child's best interest" by noting other bases for its decision, in-
52. Id. (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)). 
53. Id. at 199, 715 S.E.2d at 20. 
54. See id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 200, 715 S.E.2d at 20. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 197, 715 S.E.2d at 19. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 197-200, 715 S.E.2d at 19-20 ("[W]e hold that the Virginia Code's adoption 
statutes meet constitutional due process scrutiny because they encompass far more than 
mere consideration of the child's best interests as defined in cases involving a contest be-
tween natural parents."). 
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eluding the natural mother's parental unfitness and the fact that 
detriment to the child would result from a continuing relationship 
between the child and natural parent.61 
The Copeland decision has often baffled Virginia scholars and 
practitioners. 62 The court begged the constitutional question; the 
unanimous opinion essentially states that section 63.2-1205 is 
constitutional because it is constitutional. The court acknowl-
edged that the Supreme Court of the United States has empha-
sized that a trial court must determine more than the ''best inter-
est" of the child to terminate parental rights.63 But the court held 
that the plain meaning of the phrase ''best interest" in section 
63.2-1205 means more than ''best interest," and, therefore, is con-
stitutional. 64 
Virginia family law expert John Crouch summarizes it best: 
Although the wording of the 2006 statute is different from the 1995 
statute, in its substitution of "best interest" for "detrimental," the 
Virginia Supreme Court says that you do not have to do this using 
exactly that word [detrimental] to conform to Quilloin, etc., if you 
use other words that are adequate .... The Virginia Supreme Court 
obviously thinks the law before 1995 was O.K. anyway, and the Gen-
eral Assembly shouldn't have added a "detrimental" test. So contrary 
to best interest equates with detriment and the present statute con-
stitutionally conforms, and therefore it requires more than best in-
terests-to-wit, best interest. 
So is there at the end of the loop a crucial factor that distinguishes 
the one best interest from the other any better than that? Apparent-
ly it would have to be the only one left here, the factor that the Court 
of Appeals labored mightily to apply, but felt it just couldn't: the Pre-
sumption of Constitutionality.65 
61. Id. at 200, 715 S.E.2d at 20-21 (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 
(1978); Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 300, 192 S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972)). 
62. See PETER N. SWISHER, LAWRENCE D. DIEHL & JAMES R. COTTRELL, 9 FAMILY LAW: 
THEORY, PRACTICE AND FORMS § 14:3, at 1087 (2013) (''In reversing the Court of Ap-
peals ... the Court ... sustained the Court of Appeals with respect to its analysis that the 
'best interests' language of§ 63.2-1205 and § 63.2-1208 implicitly required as a Constitu-
tional imperative consideration of parental fitness and detriment to the child, ... [there-
fore] opinions issued under the prior wording of the statute still provide guidance to the 
practitioner ... [even though the statute has since been amended]."); John Crouch, 
Virginia Weakens Birth Parents' Constitutional Protection in Adoptions, VIRGINIA FAMILY 
LAW APPEALS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://familylaw.typepad.com/virginiafamilylawappeals/ 
2011/11/virginia-weakens-birth -parents-constitutional -protection-in-adoptions.html. 
63. Copeland, 282 Va. at 198, 715 S.E.2d at 19. 
64. Id. at 197, 200, 715 S.E.2d at 19-20. 
65. Crouch, supra note 62. 
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Crouch further explained: 
If an appellate court is going to issue rulings directly contradicting 
all the things the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly said in all its re-
cent cases on the point, it is well advised to do so at the expense of 
some group which lacks any powerful constituency or advoca-
cy/interest groups to take up its cause. Natural parents fighting in-
voluntary adoption of their children have long been such a group. 66 
Perhaps another case, in which the trial court fails to analyze 
the fitness of a parent at all before terminating rights, will pose a 
better constitutional challenge to section 63.2-1205. For now, the 
statute stands with an "implicit" requirement that trial courts 
factor the potential harm to the child into their decisions. 67 Since 
Copeland, the court of appeals has consistently upheld non-
consensual adoptions, as long as the trial court has factored an 
element of "harm" to the child into its decision.68 
But Copeland leaves the door entirely open on the harm stand-
ard in section 1202(H). Should trial courts have to find detriment 
to the child before dispensing altogether with consent per section 
1202(H)? Following Copeland, they should at the very least be re-
quired to make a Copeland style ''best interest" finding. And ac-
cording to Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding the Four-
teenth Amendment, all orders that involuntarily terminate 
parental rights must contain a finding of parental unfitness.69 As 
it stands now, section 1202(H) requires none of this. 
III. THE FLAWS OF SECTION 63.2-1202(H) 
Section 1202(H) is fundamentally flawed for a number of rea-
sons. It conflicts with Supreme Court of the United States prece-
dent establishing parenting as a fundamental right. It violates 
substantive and procedural due process rights. It violates equal 
protection by treating public and private adoptions differently. 
Finally, it invites conflicts of interest between the birth and adop-
66. Id. 
67. Copeland, 282 Va. at 194-97, 715 S.E.2d at 17-18 (citing Malpass v. Morgan, 213 
Va. 393, 399, 192 S.E.2d 798 (1972)). 
68. See, e.g., Graham v. Owens, No. 0899-12-1, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 359, at *5-6 (Va. 
Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2012) (unpublished decision) (considering the ''heinous acts" father 
committed against his other biological child in deciding he was a "risk for any other minor 
children"). 
69. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster 
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
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tive parents. Multiple states have already struck down or refused 
to apply adoption statutes similar to section 1202(H) because of 
these constitutional deficiencies. 
A Parenting as a Fundamental Right 
The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that 
parenting is a fundamental right, though the state may intervene 
under the doctrine of parens patriae to protect the interest of a 
child.70 This liberty right has evolved to encompass a range of ac-
tivities. One of the first analyzed by the Court was the right of 
parents to make fundamental decisions in the education of their 
children in Meyer v. Nebraska. 11 In Meyer, the Court character-
ized this as a liberty right under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 72 While refraining from defining what, 
exactly, the liberty right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees, the Court held that it at least includes the right to 
"establish a home and bring up children."73 The Court concluded 
that a state statute cannot be "arbitrary and without reasonable 
relation" to the state's powers. 74 
The Court affirmed this liberty right in Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, where the Court found that an Oregon law mandating par-
ents to send their young children to public schools "unreasonably 
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control."75 The 
Court instructed that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the 
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him 
for additional obligations."76 The Court found that the Oregon law 
had "no reasonable relation to some purpose within the compe-
tency of the State."77 
70. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 766 (1982) (''The fundamental liberty 
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not 
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 651 (1972). 
71. 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923). 
72. Id. at 399-400. 
73. Id. at 399. 
74. Id. at 403. 
75. 268 U.S. 510, 530, 534-35 (1925). 
76. Id. at 535. 
77. Id. at 534-35. 
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In these early cases, the Court carved out rights such as the 
right to establish a home, bring up children, and control your 
child's education. Those rights were protected from government 
interference without a showing of some reasonable relation to the 
state's police powers. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court af-
firmed both the substantive right of parents and the state's power 
to properly intervene to protect youths from the dangers of "emo-
tional excitement and psychological or physical injury."78 
These cases left open the question: is this liberty right analo-
gous to a property right or is it something more? In May v. Ander-
son, decided in 1953, the Court declared the fundamental right to 
be more than a property right because a state must obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction before intervening with any parental rights. 79 In 
Armstrong v. Manzo, the Court held that due process requires no-
tice to a biological parent before an adoption can take place.80 
Having begun to recognize procedural due process rights in 
parenthood as early as 1923, the Court took longer to establish 
substantive due process rights. In 1972, in Stanley v. Illinois, the 
Court restated that the right to create and raise a family is essen-
tial and should be free from technical restraints such as a legal 
definition based on a marriage ceremony. 81 The Court held that as 
a matter of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, 
the father was entitled to a hearing on his parental fitness before 
his children could be taken away from him. 82 While the father's 
interest was "cognizable and substantial," the state's interest in 
the children was de minimis absent a finding that Stanley was 
unfit.83 This was reiterated in Quilloin v. Walcott, where the 
Court held that the Due Process Clause "would be offended '[i]f a 
State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, 
over the objections of the parents and their children, without 
78. 321 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1944). 
79. 345 U.S. 528, 528-29, 533-34 (1953) (holding that a custody order is not entitled 
to full faith and credit if the state in which the order originated did not have personal ju-
risdiction over the parent subject to the order). However, this decision has largely been 
ignored, and further, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act obviated the need for personal jurisdiction over a respondent. Brown 
v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496, 499 & n.2 (Tenn. 1993); see 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006); UNIF. 
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 307 (1999). 
80. 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965). 
81. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
82. Id. at 658. 
83. Id. at 652, 657-58. 
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some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so 
was thought to be in the children's best interest."'84 In the land-
mark 1982 case Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court solidified 
substantive due process by holding that "a 'clear and convincing 
evidence' standard of proof" should convey the level of subjective 
certainty required to satisfy due process when terminating paren-
tal rights.85 
When the state acts within its police power regarding the wel-
fare of children, it should generally adhere to a ''best interest" 
standard.86 In the adoption context, as the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia observed in Copeland, the words ''best interest" trigger vast-
ly different standards depending on whether they are referring to 
private custody matters or the state's interference with parental 
rights.87 Certainly there needs to be varying forms of deference 
and standards of proof based upon who the parties are and the 
nature of the hearing or government intervention. But how can 
sparsely worded statutes that give no more direction than "best 
interest" meet the requirements for these multiple levels of anal-
ysis? Moreover, in Virginia Code section 63.2-1202(H), the phrase 
''best interest" does not appear at all.88 Parental rights are auto-
matically terminated by a ticking time bomb of six months.89 
B. Substantive Due Process 
As discussed, according to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, a mere finding of ''best interest" is not enough to termi-
nate parental rights; the parent must be proven unfit by clear 
and convincing evidence.90 While the Supreme Court of Virginia 
84. 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster 
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
85. 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982). 
86. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-124.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013) (requiring courts to give 
primary consideration to the best interests of the child when determining custody ar-
rangements); Id. § 20-124.3 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (defining ''best interests of the child" in vis-
itation settings). 
87. See Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 197, 715 S.E.2d 11, 19 (2011). Compare VA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (defining the ''best interest" standard in the cus-
tody and visitation context), with id. § 63.2-1205 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013) (defining 
standards where the child's ''best interest" allow the state to interfere with parental rights 
in the adoption setting). 
88. Id.§ 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
89. Id. 
90. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 
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skirted the constitutional issue in Copeland by declaring that the 
words ''best interest" in the private adoption context mean more 
than ''best interest," the substantive due process concerns posed 
by section 1202(H), as opposed to section 63.2-1205, have not 
come to the court's attention.91 Section 1202(H) decisions virtually 
never get appealed. Orders are made at the trial levels, but often 
they cannot go further because of procedural due process, equal 
protection, and conflict of interest issues, which are fleshed out in 
the remainder of this article.92 
As for substantive due process, the argument the court of ap-
peals made regarding the constitutionality of Virginia Code sec-
tion 63.2-1205 in Todd v. Copeland is relevant here-the detri-
ment of the child standard is constitutionally necessary to protect 
the due process rights of a non-consenting biological parent; 
therefore, section 1202(H) is flawed because nowhere do the 
words "detriment or harm" to the child appear. 93 The implication, 
perhaps, of the language in section 1202(H) is that the child will 
be harmed by a continued relationship because a parent who has 
not visited or communicated is an "unfit" parent. But the statute 
does not direct the court to assess the actual "fitness" of the par-
ent. 94 
Section 1202(H) indicates that a failure to visit or communicate 
may amount to a finding of "abandonment."95 In section 1202(H), 
after establishing that a failure to visit for six months may result 
in an automatic waiver of the need for consent, the legislature in-
serted the word "abandonment," even though abandonment is not 
used anywhere else in the section: "This provision shall not in-
fringe upon the birth parent's right to be noticed and heard on the 
allegation of abandonment."96 
(1978). 
91. Copeland, 282 Va. at 197-201, 715 S.E.2d at 18-21. 
92. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.l-69.5(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2013) (defining 
courts not of record); Id. § 16.1-241(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2013) (defining jurisdiction for ter-
mination of parental rights cases); Id. § 16.1-296(A) (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2013) 
(defining appeals from JDR to circuit court in these matters). 
93. Todd v. Copeland, 55 Va. App. 785, 788-92, 689 S.E.2d 784, 790-93 (2010); see VA. 
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012); Copeland, 282 Va. at 192, 199, 715 S.E.2d at 
15, 20. 
94. VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (emphasis added). 
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This verbiage is confusing. "Abandonment" is a ground for a 
termination of parental rights in public adoptions. But abandon-
ment in public adoptions means something entirely different. 97 
The state can file a petition to terminate a parent's rights if it can 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the identity 
or the whereabouts of the parents cannot be determined; (2) the 
parents have not come forward to claim the child within three 
months of the child's placement in foster care; and (3) diligent ef-
forts have been made to locate the parents, to no avail. 98 This le-
gal standard for abandonment makes no mention of failure to 
communicate or visit with the child. 
Moreover, in abandonment cases in public adoptions, the al-
leged abandonment must first be proven, and then the court must 
make a separate finding that the termination is in the best inter-
ests of the child.99 Section 1202(H), in contrast, allows termina-
tion of parental rights by syllogism. According to section 1202(H), 
lack of visitation or communication over a six-month period 
equals abandonment, which equals unfitness of the parent and or 
detriment to the child, which means the parent does not have to 
even be asked if she consents to adoption. 100 These are significant 
leaps for a legislature or court to make. 
Most shockingly, the sacred words ''best interest" do not appear 
in section 1202(H).101 Perhaps the legislature decided that it was 
implied that the statute requires the courts to make a best inter-
est determination, but the Supreme Court of the United States 
does not agree with implying rights instead of actually granting 
them. 102 Although, as discussed above, parenting is a limited fun-
damental right, this right carries with it obligations, which if ig-
nored, may result in an alteration or termination of parental in-
terests, according to Quilloin. 103 The Supreme Court of Virginia 
97. See id.§ 16.l-283(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
98. Id. 
99. See id. Part III.C.2 discusses this bifurcation during proceedings. 
100. VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
101. See id. 
102. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-88 (2008) (finding that statutory 
intent in creating a cause of action, even implied, "is determinative ... [w]ithout it, a 
cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that 
might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute"). 
103. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944)). 
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hung its entire hat on a thorough ''best interest" analysis in 
Copeland, which included requiring the court to consider a list of 
factors. 104 But these factors are only delineated in section 63.2-
1205, which does not govern any part of Virginia Code section 
63.2-1202. 105 Section 63.2-1202 does not even meet the ambiguous 
constitutional standard of Copeland. 106 
C. Procedural Due Process 
Virginia Code section 1202(H) has a number of distinct proce-
dural shortcomings. It is unconstitutionally vague. The grounds 
for waiving consent are not adjudicated separately from the issue 
of adoption. Shockingly, the words ''best interest" are absent from 
the statute. Lastly, section 1202(H) allows adoptions to take place 
without proper notice to the parent who is potentially losing a 
fundamental right. 
1. Vagueness 
A statute can be unconstitutionally vague if it does not clearly 
define what behavior is prohibited or the consequences thereof. 107 
A number of Virginia criminal statutes have been struck down as 
vague. 108 Statutes that implicate fundamental rights can also be 
subject to vagueness analysis. 109 Parental rights are not mere 
104. See Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 192, 715 S.E.2d 11, 18 (2011). 
105. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1205 (Rep!. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2013) (requiring an 
analysis of the best interests of the child), with id. § 63.2-1202 (Rep!. Vol. 2012) (making 
no mention of the best interest factors described in 63.2-1205). In fact, the phrase "best 
interest" does not even appear in section 1202 except in one specific circumstance not per-
taining to section (H). See id. § 1202(C)(3) (Rep!. Vol. 2012). Nowhere does either statutory 
section reference the other section. 
106. Despite "best interest" being paramount in Copeland, it is not even mentioned in 
section 1202(H). Compare VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1202(H) (Rep!. Vol. 2012), with Copeland, 
282 Va. at 197, 715 S.E.2d at 19. 
107. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (quoting United 
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)). 
108. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441, 444, 500 
(E.D. Va. 1999) (striking down a partial birth abortion statute as impermissibly vague); 
Tanner v. City of Va. Beach, 277 Va. 432, 435, 440, 674 S.E.2d 848, 850, 853 (2009) (strik-
ing down a municipal noise control ordinance as inherently vague); Booth v. Common-
wealth, 197 Va. 177, 177, 179, 88 S.E.2d 916, 916-17 (1955) (finding the term "improper 
person" unconstitutionally vague and indefinite in a statute relating to the purchase of 
alcohol); Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 Va. App. 150, 155, 462 S.E.2d 582, 585 (1995) (find-
ing a child endangerment statute unconstitutionally vague). 
109. See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 938, 952 (9th Cir. 1997) (find-
ing a city's juvenile curfew ordinance unconstitutionally vague and an infringement on the 
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property rights, and, in fact, many courts have held that child 
welfare proceedings are "quasi criminal" in nature.110 This is also 
reflected in privileges in state codes and in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 111 As one scholar has noted, "[state involvement in child 
welfare] is less a family matter than a quasi-criminal one," and 
an Ohio court noted that termination of parental rights in a child 
welfare case is equivalent to the death penalty in a criminal 
case. 112 This quasi-criminal nature strongly suggests that laws 
terminating parental rights should be subject to vagueness anal-
ysis. 
Virginia Code section 1202(H) is vague compared to other 
states' provisions for simultaneously waiving parental consent, 
terminating parental rights, and granting adoption based on a 
parent's lack of communication, visitation, or support. The legal 
terms of other state statutes are well defined. A number of codes 
require that the lack of contact must be "willful," "voluntary," 
done "knowingly" or "with intent," or that the parent must have 
"refused" any relationship, "notwithstanding the opportunity" or 
"ability'' to do so, or "without justifiable cause."113 This type of 
freedom of movement and a parent's fundamental right to rear his or her own child as he 
or she sees fit); State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding a 
city cruising ordinance unconstitutionally vague and a restriction on the fundamental 
right to travel); cf Heying v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1125, 1125-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (noting 
that there is no fundamental right to operate a motor vehicle and the state's habitual traf· 
fie offender statute was not subject to vagueness analysis). 
110. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) ("[A] natural parent's desire for 
and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is 
an interest far more precious than any property right." (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. 
Servs. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)) (internal quotations omitted)); see, 
e.g., State v. Frazier, 118 P.3d 224, 231 n.13 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005). 
111. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 414; FED. R. EVID. 415; ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. 
ALEXANDER, 5 NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES § 5.40 (2012) ("The rape counselor privilege is 
not necessarily confined to criminal proceedings ... but is likely to arise more often in 
child abuse proceedings, which are quasi-criminal in nature."). The lines between civil and 
criminal cases involving children are often blurred. In civil cases involving a claim predi-
cated on an alleged conduct of sexual assault or child molestation, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence permit admittance of any of the defendant's prior acts of criminal sexual assault 
or child molestation. FED. R. Evrn. 415. 
112. In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); F. Paul Kurmay, Children in 
the Probate Courts of Connecticut Building a Case for Greater Resources, 14 QUINNIPIAC 
PROB. L.J. 227, 232 (1999). 
113. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-lOA-9 (2013) (allowing consent or relinquishment to be 
implied if a parent "[k]nowingly leav[es] the adoptee with others without provision for 
support and without communication" or does not otherwise maintain a "significant paren-
tal relationship with the adopted for a period of six months"); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8604(b) 
(West Cum. Supp. 2013) (obviating the need for consent of a noncustodial birth parent if 
that parent "for a period of one year willfully fails to communicate with and to pay for the 
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language indicates that other state legislatures are at least mind-
ful of situations like the one described in the introduction of this 
article. The Utah Code explicitly states that if an unmarried bio-
logical father is "prevented from complying'' with steps proscribed 
by statute to establish a "substantial relationship" with his child 
by a party with custody of the child, he can legally bypass those 
steps and establish the relationship, which in turn makes his 
consent required for adoption.114 
Many state legislatures' parental consent bypass prov1s1ons 
have more teeth than Virginia's statute. Courts in other states 
have also strictly construed statutes which bypass parental con-
sent.115 These courts have decided to step in to resolve any breach 
care, support, and education of the child when able to do so"); D.C. CODE § 16-304(d) 
(2013) (obviating the need for parental consent when that parent has abandoned the child 
and "voluntarily failed to contribute" to the child's support for six months immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition for adoption); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.502(1)(e) (Lex-
isNexis 2007) (obviating the need for parental consent if the parent has "continuously or 
repeatedly failed or refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of providing 
essential parental care and protection for the child" for six months or more with no rea-
sonable expectation of improvement); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-3B-22(b) (LexisNexis 
2012) (allowing a court to grant an adoption without parental consent if the parent has not 
had custody of the child for at least one year and if, while the child was in petitioner's cus-
tody, the parent ''has not maintained meaningful contact ... notwithstanding an oppor-
tunity to do so"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-18(A) (2013) (allowing consent to an adoption to 
be implied "if the parent, without justifiable cause" has left the child with others, includ-
ing the other parent or an agency, for specified periods without communication and provi-
sions for support); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 111(2)(a) (Consol. 2009) (obviating the need for 
parental consent to adoption if a parent or custodian "evinces an intent to forego his or her 
parental or custodial rights and obligations as manifested by his or her failure for a period 
of six months to visit the child and communicate with the child or person having legal cus-
tody of the child, although able to do so") (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505.4-
2(B) (2011) ("Consent to adoption is not required from a parent who, for a period of twelve 
(12) consecutive months out of the last fourteen (14) months immediately preceding the 
filing of a petition for adoption, has ... willfully failed, refused, or neglected to contribute 
to the support of such minor."); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.324(1) (2011) (allowing the court to 
grant an adoption without parental consent if the parent "is believed to have willfully de-
serted the child or neglected without just and sufficient cause to provide proper care and 
maintenance for the child for one year" immediately preceding the filing of a petition for 
adoption); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-llO(a) (2013) (allowing the court to order an adoption 
without written consent if the court finds that the putative father or non-consenting par-
ent has "[w]illfully failed to contribute to the support of the child for a period of one (1) 
year immediately prior to the filing of the petition to adopt and has failed to bring the 
support obligation current"). 
114. See UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-6-121(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
115. Doe v. Doe III (In re John Doe), 266 P.3d 1182, 1184-85 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011) ('1n 
order to 'willfully' fail to maintain a normal parental relationship, the parent must have 
the ability to maintain it and choose not to do so." (citing Doe I v. Doe II, 228 P.3d 980, 983 
(Idaho 2010))); see also In re Adoption of Jessica Lee T., No. 2892-M, 1999 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 2563, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. June 2, 1999) ("Under this statute, only where a peti-
tioner can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the non-consenting parent, without 
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caused by apparent vagueness. Many go further to indicate that 
"[t]he willfulness of a parent's conduct is an essential element of 
[the] statutory definition of abandonment."116 The Supreme Court 
of Wyoming explained that "every reasonable intendment is made 
in favor of the [non-consenting] parent's claims."117 
In particular, courts scrutinize the behavior of all the parties in 
non-consent adoptions. A Utah court specifically applied and up-
held the Utah provision noted above in a case where the mother 
had failed to notify the father of the pending adoption when the 
father "had established a 'substantial relationship' with [the] 
[c]hild and had 'taken some measure of responsibility"' and was 
thus entitled to notice. 118 In a case where a friendly custody 
agreement between mother, father, and foster parents went sour, 
a Tennessee court concluded that there is no "willful failure to 
visit" when there is "undisputed ... animosity between the par-
ties," which contributes to what may appear, at first glance, as a 
parent's failure to visit. 119 In another Tennessee case, the court of 
appeals found that the grandparents had not met their burden to 
establish the mother abandoned the child because they refused to 
respond to the mother's visitation requests, failed to place the 
mother's name on school records, and rebuffed her attempts to 
provide financial support in "an obvious attempt to deny [her] the 
opportunity" to be involved in the child's life. 120 A Michigan court 
any justification whatsoever, failed to maintain contact with the minor child for one year, 
will the court permit adoption without parental consent."). 
116. See, e.g., In re C.T.B., No. M2009-00316-COA-R3-PT, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 416, 
at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2009) (citing In re M.L.P. 281 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Mar. 27, 2009); In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2005)). 
117. J.W.R. v. R.G. (In re Adoption of G.S.D.), 716 P.2d 984, 988 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting 
A.L.T. v. D.W.D. (In re Adoption of C.C.T.), 640 P.2d 73, 74 (Wyo. 1982)); see also In re 
Adoption of K.M.M., 611 P.2d 84, 84, 86-87 (Alaska 1980) (preventing a stepfather from 
adopting children where the biological father, who had placed money in a trust for them 
and written them letters, had not "substantially without justification" failed to meet the 
requirements of providing care and support for his children); In re Adoption of McCoy, 31 
Ohio Misc. 195, 201 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1972) (preventing a stepfather from adopting chil-
dren where the biological father did not willfully fail to pay support). 
118. T.S. v. L.F. (In re Adoption of S.L.F.), 27 P.3d 583, 585, 587-88 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001). The statutory provision the court refers to, section 78-30-414(2)(a), was recodified at 
the current section 78B-6-12(2) in 2008. UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE, TITLE 78 
RECODIFICATION SECTION COMPARISON CHART (OLD-NEW) (2008), auailable at http://le. 
utah.gov/session/2008/pdfdoc/TITLE78RecodificationChartoldNew.pdf. 
119. In re Adoption A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 796-801, 810--11 (Tenn. 2007) (noting 
that at one point, an incident occurred at the foster parents' home resulting in the police 
telling the biological parents that they would be arrested should they return to the foster 
parents' home). 
120. In re Alex B.T., No. W2011-00511-COA-R3-PT, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 617, at *3-
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summarized it best in a case where the petitioning grandmother 
admitted she did not allow the child to visit the mother when, for 
example, a school project was due: "Failure to allow visits and 
contact does not equate to failure to visit, contact, or communi-
cate."121 
New York courts have held that parents who are inhibited from 
complying with procedural measures (for example, to establish 
their legitimacy) by the potential adoptive parents or by anyone 
else, may not have their consent waived automatically. 122 The 
New York court held that when a father was unable to forge a le-
gal relationship with his child because of the underhanded ac-
tions of others, he could not be barred from the protections of a 
statute designed to establish parenthood.123 Even if a parent has 
not visited or cultivated a personal relationship with the child, if 
other parties' actions cause procedural failures (such as not being 
able to register with the putative father registry in time), the fa-
ther's consent cannot be bypassed. 124 
In Virginia, prior to the enactment of section 1202(H), the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia had an occasion to define "abandon-
ment" in the private adoption context and eliminate any statutory 
vagueness. In Robinette v. Keene, the court of appeals had to de-
termine if the drastic, improvised, and sometimes hard-to-believe 
actions of a mother rose to the level of abandonment. 125 In ruling 
that they did not, the court recognized a strong presumption in 
favor of the rights of natural parents-a presumption dashed by 
the enactment of section 1202(H).126 
Jessie Robinette learned that her husband Danny was molest-
ing their five-year-old daughter. 121 The next day Danny's aunt 
drove Jessie, the five-year-old daughter, and their two-year-old 
daughter to a social services center so Jessie could report the in-
5, *9, *12, *25-27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121. In re Brown, No. 307158, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 915, at *45 (Mich. Ct. App. May 
10, 2012). 
122. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl S, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676, 679, 683 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 
1988) (finding consent before adoption by the father necessary when father was "able and 
willing," to have a relationship with his child but was prevented from doing so by the 
mother). 
123. Id. at 681-83. 
124. Id. at 679, 682-83. 
125. 2 Va. App. 578, 579, 347 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1986). 
126. Id. at 585-86, 347 S.E.2d at 160-61. 
127. Id. at 579, 347 S.E.2d at 157. 
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cident to authorities. 128 The reporting at the center took longer 
than expected, and not knowing where she and her five-year-old 
daughter would be spending the night, Jessie asked the aunt to 
take the two-year-old daughter home with her until Jessie was 
able to come get her. 129 Jessie and the five-year-old daughter spent 
the night and the following week in a spousal abuse center, and 
finally, took refuge in Jessie's father's farm. 130 Jessie did not im-
mediately make arrangements to retrieve the two-year-old 
daughter from the aunt for multiple reasons: she lacked transpor-
tation, there was no phone on the farm, and she feared that going 
to the aunt's house could let her husband Danny, who had threat-
ened to kill her, know where she and the children were. 131 
Unbeknownst to Jessie, after his abuse arrest, Danny made ar-
rangements with a deputy sheriff to find a new home for their 
daughters. 132 Almost two months after Jessie had left the house 
with the daughters, Danny executed an entrustment agreement 
to place the daughters with Mr. and Mrs. Keene, a couple from 
the deputy's church who was receptive to providing a home for 
the daughters. 133 On the day the entrustment was executed, a so-
cial service worker retrieved the two-year-old daughter from the 
aunt and visited the farm to speak with Jessie about the five-
year-old daughter. 134 Jessie was not at the farm, and the five-year-
old daughter had been left in the care of Jessie's uncle. 135 The so-
cial worker visited multiple times that day to speak with Jessie, 
but Jessie was never there. 136 In her last visit, the social worker 
told Jessie's father to bring either Jessie or the five-year-old 
daughter to the social services office by 9:00 the next morning.137 
When Jessie failed to appear at the farm the next morning, Jes-
sie's father took the five-year-old to social services. 138 Jessie ex-
plained away her absence at trial, testifying that the car she was 
riding in had become disabled on a back road, and the car trouble 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 579-80, 347 S.E.2d at 157. 
130. Id. at 580, 347 S.E.2d at 157. 
131. Id. 
132. Id., S.E.2d at 157-58. 
133. Id. at 579-81, 347 S.E.2d at 157-58. 
134. Id. at 581, 347 S.E.2d at 158. 
135. Id. at 581-82, 347 S.E.2d at 158. 
136. Id. at 582, 347 S.E.2d at 158. 
137. Id. at 581-82, 347 S.E.2d at 158. 
138. Id. at 582, 347 S.E.2d at 158. 
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combined with a lack of phone on the farm impeded her from get-
ting back until later the next morning.139 
The same morning Jessie's father delivered the five-year-old to 
social services, the juvenile and domestic relations ("JDR") court 
ordered the five-year-old' s removal from Jessie and placed her 
with the Keenes. 140 Jessie did not sit idly by-she visited with her 
daughters at the social services office and requested additional 
visits when the social worker told her that she had a "tight 
schedule" and could not accommodate further visits. 141 A home 
study revealed Jessie "had obtained adequate housing and ap-
peared to be making sincere efforts in working with Social Ser-
vices in order to have her children returned home."142 Two weeks 
after the five-year-old was removed from Jessie's custody, Danny 
gave his consent for the Keenes to adopt both daughters. 143 The 
Keenes shortly thereafter filed petitions for adoption for both 
children, alleging Jessie had abandoned the girls and was an un-
fit mother. 144 Less than a year after Jessie had left her marriage 
fearing for her and her daughters' safety, and a little over four 
months after those daughters were placed in the Keene's custody, 
a judge terminated Jessie's parental rights, ruling that Jessie had 
abandoned her daughters and was an unfit parent.145 
The court of appeals, in a rare moment of sympathy for a natu-
ral parent, seemed appalled at this termination of parental 
rights. 146 According to the court of appeals, operating de novo, 
both the JDR court and the circuit court had made the decision to 
permanently sever ties between mother and children absent any 
"clear, cogent, [or] convincing'' proof that Jessie abandoned her 
daughters or was an unfit parent. 147 
Robinette gave us some inkling about what did not constitute 
"abandonment" in the private adoption context before section 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. The two-year-old was placed with the Keenes that day as well. Id. at 581, 347 
S.E.2d at 158. 
142. Id. at 583, 347 S.E.2d at 159 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 579-83, 347 S.E.2d at 157, 159. 
146. Id. at 585, 347 S.E.2d at 160 ("There is not a scintilla of evidence to support the 
finding that Robinette abandoned [the daughters]."). 
147. Id. at 582-85, 347 S.E.2d at 158-60. 
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1202(H)'s enactment, but this decision is a one-off. There are sys-
temic roadblocks to addressing any vagueness issues. Termina-
tions of parental rights and adoptions rarely get overturned. 148 
Virginia practitioners have observed that trying to appeal a ter-
mination of parental rights under most grounds is futile. 149 And 
since the enactment of the new private adoption statute in 1995, 
not a single case under section 1202(H) has ever reached the ap-
pellate level specifically on the substantive issue of what consti-
tutes "abandonment."150 This is not for lack of petitions and orders 
brought under section 1202(H); there are significant procedural 
and equal protection issues that impede parents' ability to bring 
appeals.151 
The court in Robinette, for the first and only time in this con-
text, noted other problems with bringing and successfully arguing 
appeals-the lack of a JDR court record and irregularities of both 
JDR and circuit court practice. 
The record before us does not contain the record of proceedings in the 
juvenile and domestic relations district court. The transcript of pro-
ceedings in the circuit court indicates that the record was available 
in the circuit court. The trial court was advised by counsel for the 
Keenes that the juvenile and domestic relations district court did not 
terminate Robinette's residual parental rights and did not take fur-
ther action beyond removal of [the child] from [the great aunt's] 
home and placement of both children in the Keenes' foster care. 
No issue is raised as to the regularity of the proceedings in the ju-
venile and domestic relations district court. We note, however, that 
the absence of the record of proceedings in that court, an omission 
which is not confined to this case, hinders our full consideration of 
appeals involving parents and their children.152 
148. See COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, OFFICE OF THE EXEC. SEC'Y, SUPREME COURT 
OF VA., TABLE OF APPEALS OF TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF VIRGINIA AND THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA (2013) [hereinafter TABLE OF 
APPEALS], available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/cip/resources/tpr_tab 
le.pdf (last updated July 11, 2013). As Richard Crouch puts it, "DSS has always been pret-
ty sure of having any parental right termination upheld on appeal." Family Law Newslet-
ter, 26 FAM. L. SEC. NEWSLETTER (Richard E. Crouch ed., Virginia State Bar), Spring 2006, 
at 31, available at http://www.vsb.org/docs/sections/family/spring2006.pdf. 
149. Family Law Newsletter, supra note 148. 
150. See TABLE OF APPEALS, supra note 148. The Supreme Court of Virginia touched on 
the issue of abandonment in its evaluation of the phrase "prior to" in section 1202(H) in 
Copeland v. Todd, but the court did not set a clear standard of what constitutes abandon-
ment. See Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 194, 715 S.E.2d 11, 17 (2011). 
151. See, e.g., infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. 
152. Robinette, 2 Va. App. at 582 n.2, 347 S.E.2d at 158 n.2. 
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Since the enactment of section 1202(H), it is even harder for a 
parent to successfully appeal a private adoption granted on aban-
donment grounds, because the court may waive parental consent 
and issue the adoption order in one fell swoop.153 So even if a par-
ent appears at the hearing for a petition filed under section 
1202(H), there is typically no record of any defenses to any aspect 
of the proceeding.154 A de novo trial in circuit court may offer a 
second chance to create a record for appeal, but it is not recorded 
either, unless the parent hires a court reporter, which is unlike-
ly.155 Legal errors can slip by in a heartbeat when there is no rec-
ord. 
This is perfectly exemplified by two recent Virginia cases. In 
Campos v. Hirsch, a biological father appealed the termination of 
his rights by the circuit court. 156 The mother signed an entrust-
ment agreement prior to the birth of the child, giving appellee 
custody of her child. 157 She mailed a certified letter to the incar-
cerated father about steps he must take to object. 158 The father 
never got the letter, and it was returned as unclaimed. 159 During 
the JDR court proceedings, an appointed counsel represented the 
father's interests because he was incarcerated. 160 The court did 
not grant a continuance so the father could be present at the trial, 
and at the trial, he lost his parental rights due to his failure to 
appear. 161 The father appealed this decision, but the court of ap-
peals upheld it because the appellant failed to file transcripts or 
written statements of facts pursuant to Supreme Court of Virgin-
153. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 63.2·1202(H), -1203(A) (Rep!. Vol. 2012). 
154. See infra notes 156-75 and accompanying text. 
155. In Virginia, parties must pay for their own court reporters in civil proceedings. See 
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-128 (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2013). One company charges 
$130 for the appearance alone. RATE SHEET COOK & WILEY (2013). The party must also 
cover the parking fees for the reporter, and the actual transcript costs a minimum of $3.80 
per page. See, e.g., id. In five years of practice, the author has never seen an indigent par-
ty, or a low income party without an attorney, hire a court reporter in any court in Virgin-
ia. 
156. Campos v. Hinsch, No. 2465-10-1, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 313, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. 
Oct. 11, 2011) (unpublished decision). Although Mr. Campos's consent could have been by-
passed via section 1202(H), the trial court ruled pursuant to section 63.2-1202(J), citing 
Mr. Campos' failure to appear at the hearing as grounds to obviate consent. Id. at *4. 
157. Id. at *1-2. 
158. Id. at *2. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at *3--4. 
161. Id. 
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ia Rule 5A:8. 162 The court held that the attorney for the father on-
ly ever "noted his objections" but did not articulate a basis for ob-
jecting.163 "Without a transcript or written statement of facts from 
the hearings themselves, we are unable to determine whether 
appellant provided the trial court any basis for his request for a 
continuance, and whether he lodged specific and timely objections 
to the trial court's ruling denying his requested continuance."164 
Mr. Campos lost his parental rights and the right to appeal their 
loss due to his incarcerated status and not his parenting. The in-
formation outlining how he could establish putative parental 
rights never reached him. The refusal to grant a continuance un-
til he could appear in court essentially predetermined his case on 
section 63.2-1202(J) grounds before trial. And the lack of a trial 
record ensured an appeals court would have easy, airtight 
grounds to dismiss his appeal. 
In Hughes v. Hughes, the appellant mother objected to the fa-
ther and stepmother's petition for adoption.165 At trial, the mother 
purposely did not appear because she was in an out-of-state drug 
treatment program-she instructed her counsel to make a motion 
for a continuance.166 No court order forbade her from leaving the 
program in order to attend court. 167 The judge inquired into 
whether the mother could have, in fact, been present for the trial, 
to which her counsel responded that, while she could, she felt that 
completing her drug counseling was important. 168 While mother's 
counsel might have advised her not to attend the trial, no evi-
dence of this was ever entered into the record.169 The court denied 
the continuance, and the court then found that the mother had 
both abandoned the child and withheld consent contrary to the 
best interests of the child.110 On appeal, the court of appeals noted 
that nothing in the record supported the contention that her 
counsel had told her not to attend her trial date, and the record 
actually indicated that, if she had wanted to, she could have 
162. Id. at *6-7; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:8 (Repl. Vol. 2013). 
163. Id. at *4-5. 
164. Id. at *7. 
165. Hughes v. Hughes, No. 1530-10-1, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 85, at *1 0/a. Ct. App. 
Mar. 8, 2011) (unpublished decision). 
166. Id. at *4. 
167. Id. at *11. 
168. Id. at *4-5. 
169. Id. at *8-11. 
170. Id. at *5. 
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come. 171 "Given appellant's concessions and the absence of any ev-
idence in the record supporting her allegations against her coun-
sel, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the continuance motion."112 The court also rejected the 
due process argument, noting that the mother had notice and had 
chosen not to appear. 173 Finally, the court dismissed the "ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel" argument. 174 The court noted that, 
again, the arguments the mother put forward went beyond "the 
record."115 
On the positive side, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in some 
termination of parental rights contexts, has been mindful of pro-
cedural protections for parents. In Carlton u. Paxton, for example, 
the court allowed a father to appeal, even though he failed to 
comply with proper procedures, because the circuit court's service 
of the original court order was defective. 176 "As the Supreme Court 
of Virginia has made plain, these rules have been designed to pro-
tect the appellee [adoptive parent in this case], not to penalize the 
appellant."111 
In F.E. u. G.F.M., the court of appeals allowed a father to chal-
lenge an adoption after the six month statutory time limit be-
cause to do otherwise would violate due process. 178 The court held 
that, "[b]ecause the limitation period contained in Code § 63.1-
237 affected father's fundamental right to maintain [his already 
established] relationship with his son, we evaluate its constitu-
tionality . . . under the 'strict scrutiny' test."119 Likewise, if the 
court of appeals ever had an opportunity to rule on a procedural 
defect of an adoption filed under section 1202(H), strict scrutiny 
might be applied and some of the procedural roadblocks to ad-
dressing vagueness in private adoption may fall due to their lack 
of narrow tailoring. 
171. Id.at*l0-11. 
172. Id. at *11. 
173. Id. at *11-12. 
174. Id. at *14-15. 
175. Id. 
176. 14 Va. App. 105, 114, 415 S.E.2d 600, 605 (1992). 
177. Id. at 110, 415 S.E.2d at 602. 
178. 35 Va. App. 648, 661, 547 S.E.2d 531, 537-38 (2001). 
179. Id. at 664, 547 S.E.2d at 539. 
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2. Lack of Bifurcation 
a. Background 
As discussed, according to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, parental rights cannot be terminated without clear and 
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit. 180 The petitioner, 
whether an agency or a private person, bears this burden of 
proof.181 
After hearing evidence about a parent's fitness, the court must 
decide whether terminating the parent's rights is in the child's 
best interest during what is known as the "dispositional" stage.182 
At this stage, parties may introduce new evidence.183 The disposi-
tion concludes with the court either entering an order of termina-
tion or specifying that another order is in the best interests of the 
child.184 
To be clear, the court does not reach the dispositional stage un-
til petitioner proves the grounds for termination, based on the 
parent's behavior.185 States use different procedures for adjudicat-
ing the disposition after a termination of parental rights. Most 
states hold one hearing but listen to the evidence about the "fit-
ness" of a parent first, and then, if the grounds for termination 
are proven, decide what is in the best interests of the child.186 
Some courts hold two separate hearings. 187 In either format, the 
fact finding to determine if the statutory ground for termination 
exists is wholly separate from the fact finding to determine the 
disposition. 
180. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982). 
181. Walker v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Page Cnty., 223 Va. 557, 560, 290 S.E.2d 887, 
889 (1982). 
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.2 (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2013); see Farrell v. 
Warren Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 385-86, 719 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2012). 
183. Farrell, 59 Va. App. at 385, 719 S.E.2d at 334. 
184. Susan B. Hershkowitz, Due Process and the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 
FAM. L.Q. 245, 283 (1985). Another order might be permanent guardianship, with the par· 
ent retaining rights. 
185. See id. 
186. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION 
GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INvOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS (2013), availa-
ble at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf; 
Hershkowitz, supra note 184, at 283 n.295. 
187. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(3)(g) (Consol. 2011). 
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Many appellate courts have found the separation of issues in 
this two-step process to be imperative.188 But states differ on 
whether the evidence at this dispositional stage must also be 
clear and convincing.189 While there must be at least clear and 
convincing evidence to support the termination of parental rights, 
the Supreme Court has not weighed in on the standard at dispo-
sition.190 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana alluded to one underlying 
reason for this bifurcation: preserving the "neutrality" of the deci-
sion-maker.191 If specific evidence regarding the child's best inter-
est-for example, testimony about the child's bond with the po-
tential adoptive parents-is presented at the same time as the 
evidence about the biological parent's shortcomings, it might bias 
the fact-finder. The Supreme Court of California put this princi-
ple into practice when it noted that it was unjust for a father's 
fitness to be weighed at the same time that evidence regarding 
the prospective adoptive family was put forward. 192 Others states 
have made it clear that even if a child might be subjectively bet-
ter off with another family, this cannot be put forth as evidence 
188. See, e.g., J.M. v. R.P (In re Adoption of C.A.P.), 869 N.E.2d 214, 217-18 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2007); G.L. v. M.P. (In re G.L. & K.A.), 768 N.E.2d 367, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Kimock 
v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 855 (Pa. 2012); In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 915-16 (Pa. 2008). 
189. The evidentiary standard at disposition is often not specified in state codes. See 
e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 631 (Consol. Cum. Supp. 2013). Where this is the case, some 
courts have applied the clear and convincing standard. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.S.R., 
374 A.2d 860, 864 (D.C. 1977); In re Adoption of Noble, 349 So.2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1977); In re Adoption of Children, 233 A.2d 188, 192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967); 
Mark Hardin & Josephine Bulkley, The Rights of Foster Parents to Challenge Removal 
and to Seek Adoption of Their Foster Children, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 299, 
321 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (noting that most termination statues require proof by clear 
and convincing evidence). But see, e.g., In re Adoption of B.A.B., 842 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 1992) ("[I]t is for the probate judge in such cases to weigh the benefits flowing to 
children from the granting of an adoption .... As shown by the probate judge's comments, 
we are satisfied that the judge carefully considered these ... interests in making his deci· 
sion. Based upon our de novo review, we cannot say that his decision was clearly against 
the preponderance [of the] evidence."); Bonnie S.P. v. Phillip P. (In re Adoption of C.D.), 
729 N.E.2d 553, 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("After our review of the record, we find that the 
circuit court's decision to give custody to the foster parents was within its discretion and 
not against the manifest weight of the evidence."). 
190. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982); see In re Valentine, 79 
S.E.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) (illustrating how Tennessee statutes and case law use the 
"clear and convincing" standard of evidence to determine both the grounds for termination 
and the inquiry into the child's best interest). 
191. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So.2d 545, 555-56 (La. 1990). 
192. Comelis D. v. Ronald D. (In re Charlotte D.), 202 P.3d 1109, 1113-15 (Cal. 2009) 
(noting that the father's fitness did not necessarily have to be discussed at the hearing). 
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for why a parent's rights should be terminated. 193 Virginia case 
law also hints at the following principle: "The obligation to com-
ply with the statutory scheme that has been designed by the leg-
islature to protect parents and children cannot be abandoned by a 
judge under the guise of seeking to 'promote the best interests of 
a child."'194 
b. Virginia 
Virginia courts adjudicate terminations of parental rights 
based on the unfitness of a parent in one hearing. 195 When the pe-
tition is brought by a state social service agency, it is clear under 
statute and according to court forms that the grounds for termi-
nation and the best interest of the child must be proven on their 
own merits.196 But section 1202(H), governing petitions brought 
by a private person, does not mandate or give the court any ave-
nue for adjudicating the fitness of the parent separately from the 
best interest evidence. In short, section 1202(H) does not call for 
any bifurcation. 
In order to properly compare section 1202(H) with other states' 
statutes, we must examine only those statutes that do exactly 
what section 1202(H) does-waive the need for consent based on 
abandonment. In fact, several of these statutes specifically re-
quire that the waiver hearing be bifurcated from the best interest 
analysis. According to these statutes, first the trial court must de-
termine that there are grounds to waive consent and if that is 
193. See, e.g., Milam v. Evans (Jn re Adoption of Milam), 766 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1989); In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., 736 A.2d 1277, 1281 (N.J. 1999) ("Merely 
showing that a child would be better off with an adoptive parent rather than with the bio-
logical parent is not enough."). 
194. Willis v. Gamez, 20 Va. App. 75, 82, 455 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1995) (quoting Malpass 
v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 398, 192 S.E.2d 794, 798 (1972)). 
195. VA. CODE ANN.§ 16.1-283(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
196. In termination of parental rights actions brought by the state, at the conclusion of 
the hearing, the court may issue an "Order for Termination of Residual Parental Rights." 
Order for Termination of Residual Parental Rights, DC-531, available at http://www. 
courts.state.va.us/forms/district/dc531.pdf. According to the form, the court must find 
"based upon clear and convincing evidence" that a ground for termination exists and in 
accordance with Virginia Code section 16.1-283(G) that "it is in the child's best interests 
that the residual parental rights of the above-named parent be terminated." Id. 
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proven, then decide whether waiving consent is in the best inter-
ests of the child. 197 Virginia's statute does not even come close to 
requiring this. 
3. No Adjudication of Best Interest 
In fact, in section 1202(H), according to the plain language, 
courts are not required to make a finding of ''best interest" of the 
child. The prospective adoptive parent simply has to "establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that the birth parent(s), without 
just cause, has neither visited nor contacted the child for a period 
of six months" and the birth parent's consent is waived. 198 No-
where do the words ''best interest" appear in section 1202(H), nor 
does section 1202(H) reference the best interest requirements in 
section 63.2-1205.199 The court has absolutely no obligation to ana-
lyze whether it is in the best interests of the child to waive paren-
tal consent or in the best interests of the child to terminate pa-
rental rights. The court may simply find that a parent has not 
visited for a six-month period and waives parental consent. 
This is significant because appellate courts in other states have 
overturned adoptions, despite finding that parent's consent is not 
necessary, when waiving consent would go against the best inter-
ests of the child.200 The Supreme Court of Montana reversed an 
adoption where the trial court chose not to analyze the child's 
best interest.201 The supreme court specifically held that "[h]aving 
determined that the nonsupporting parent's consent to adoption 
is not required, the district court must then exercise its discretion 
in determining whether the adoption is in the child's best inter-
est."202 The court cited to previous precedent where child support 
payments were not met by the father, but the father-child rela-
tionship was strong enough that severing it would not have been 
in the best interests of the child, and thus, the termination of pa-
197. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-10 (Supp. 2013); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 
(2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 26-8A-27 (Cum. Supp. 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 
(Supp. 2012). 
198. VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
199. Supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. 
200. See, e.g., In re Adoption ofV.R.O. & V.N.O., 822 P.2d 83, 81H37 (Mont. 1991); In re 
B.M.S., 949 N.E.2d 111, 114, 117 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
201. In re Adopticn of V.R.O. & V.N.O., 822 P.2d at 86--87. 
202. Id. at 86. 
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rental rights was inappropriate.203 In Montana, "[t]he natural 
parent's rights cannot be terminated ... independent of the de-
termination that adoption is appropriate" and "[a]doption is not 
appropriate unless it is found to be in the child's best interest."204 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Illinois refused to apply a 
waiver statute and overturned an adoption because it was against 
the best interests of the child given the shocking facts. 205 The 
mother gave birth and told the father that the child had died. 206 
The adoptive parents and their attorney made no attempts to lo-
cate the father even though the mother told them she knew who 
the father was.207 Therefore, the Illinois statute requiring the bio-
logical father to show a "reasonable degree of interest in the child 
within 30 days of his life" did not apply in that case.208 
Ohio has held likewise. In a recent case, the appellant present-
ed facts of a birth parent's waiver of consent as a result of his un-
justifiable failure to support his children for the preceding year, 
and the appellate court upheld the trial court's order waiving 
consent.209 However, the supreme court denied the actual adop-
tion petition because the appellate court found that severing the 
parent-child relationship was against the best interests of the 
children.210 The court concluded, "[n]either we, nor the trial court, 
may consider these positive factors [about adoption] in a vacuum 
.... By weighing these factors against the negative effect of los-
ing their relationship with their biological father ... the adoption 
was not in the best interest of the children."211 
In all of these rulings, judges found technical grounds to waive 
consent, but because the best interest of the child is always par-
amount, they either choose not to waive consent or did not termi-
nate the parental rights. These courts had the explicit statutory 
ability to choose these options. Virginia judges do not; if a parent 
has failed to visit, it does not matter whether waiving consent is 
in the best interest-the court does not even have to consider it. 
203. Id. (citing In re S.T.V., 733 P.2d 841, 842-43 (Mont. 1987)). 
204. Id. at 87. 
205. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182-83 (Ill. 1994). 
206. Id. at 181. 
207. Id. at 182. 
208. Id. at 182 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (1993)). 
209. In re B.M.S., 949 N.E.2d 111, 113 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
210. Id. at 116-17. 
211. Id. at 117. 
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4. Lack of Notice 
Lack of notice is an inevitable problem with section 1202(H) 
due to the streamlining of the procedure. If a parent misses the 
section 1202(H) hearing, she has lost it all: her consent is waived, 
her parental rights are terminated, and the adoption is granted.212 
This almost occurred in the case described in the introduction of 
this article, as it could with any a parent who has been prevented 
from visiting or contacting her child, at least partially due to the 
actions of others. If the adoptive and natural parents have 
strained relations, the adoptive parent may not know, or may 
claim not to know, where the natural parent is currently living, 
allowing personal service at a last known address, or worse, by 
publication.213 This goes against the Supreme Court of the United 
States principle that "[w]hen the State moves to destroy weak-
ened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamen-
t 11 f . d ,,214 a y air proce ures. 
D. Other States Have Struck Down Adoption Statutes on 
Constitutional Grounds 
Numerous states have struck down private adoption statutes 
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. A Louisiana statute required 
maternal consent in order for a father's name to be put on a birth 
certificate, thus giving the mother power over the father's right to 
be heard on a matter of adoption. 215 The Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana found this unconstitutional because "[b]efore a person is de-
prived of a protected interest, he must be afforded some kind of 
hearing, except for extraordinary situations where some valid 
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the 
hearing until after the event."216 The court held that granting an 
adoption was not an "emergency situation" that could override 
the father's procedural rights.217 
212. Cf supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text. 
213. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-296, -316, -317 (Rep!. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
214. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982). 
215. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:34(B)(l)(a)(iv), (h) (Supp. 2013); In re B.G.S., 556 
S.E.2d 545, 548 (La. 1990). 
216. Id. at 552 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971)). 
217. Id. at 555. 
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A Texas statute provided that if an alleged father did not regis-
ter with the putative father registry before his child was born or 
within thirty-one days after birth or take other steps to protect 
his parental rights, those rights could be terminated without no-
tice, service, or any attempt to locate him. 218 A Texas trial court 
found this unconstitutional.219 The court struck down the statute, 
even though there was no actual injury to the appellant, because 
it did not require due diligence to locate the alleged father, ser-
vice of process on the alleged father, appointment of an attorney 
ad litem to represent the alleged father's interests, or a best in-
terest finding. 220 
In New York, a statute allowing for extrajudicial consent to an 
adoption was held unconstitutional on its face because it did not 
require informing the birth parents that, if they consented, they 
would not necessarily receive their child back if they withdrew 
consent; instead, the child's placement would be determined on a 
''best interest" analysis.221 Invalidating the statute, the court held 
that a court may not terminate all parental rights by offering a 
child for adoption where there has been no parental consent, 
abandonment, neglect or proven unfitness, even though some 
might find adoption to be in the child's best interests."222 
Although the Supreme Court of Nebraska found a statute re-
garding procedures for adjudicating paternity constitutional, it 
was unconstitutionally applied to a man who had established a 
familial relationship with his child despite not complying with 
the statute.223 The court noted that "[a]lthough we do not agree 
218. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.402, -404 (West 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
161.002{b)-(d) (West 2008). 
219. In re C.M.D., 287 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Tex. App. 2009). 
220. Id. The appellate court reversed the decision citing no actual injury in the case. Id. 
at 516. Even though it did not rule on the merits, the court suggested in dicta that the 
unwed father does not have "full constitutional parental rights by virtue of a mere biologi-
cal relation." Id. 
221. In re Sarah K., 492 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); see N.Y. DOM. REL. 
LAW§ 115-b (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1987). 
222. In re Sarah K., 492 N.Y. S.2d at 961 (citing Corey L. v. Martin L. (In re Corey L.), 
380 N.E.2d 266, 271 (N.Y. 1978)); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) 
(supporting the rights of unwed fathers); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 387 (1979) 
(noting that the requirement of consent is a separate question from determining the best 
interests of the child); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (explaining that the 
father's lack of responsibility for the child prevented him from using his veto authority); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding that the father was entitled to a hear-
ing). 
223. Rusti M. v. John J. (In re Adoption of Corbin J.), 775 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Neb. 2009). 
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with John that he is an adjudicated father, we do agree with 
John's constitutional analysis .... [T]he challenged statutes were 
unconstitutionally applied to John," because they "infringed on 
[his] constitutionally protected parental rights."224 The court held 
that the father is entitled to the right to be heard on the matter of 
adoption. 225 
These states examined their statutes in difficult cases and 
struck them down or refused to apply them when they incorrectly 
denied constitutional rights. As discussed in Part II, the Supreme 
Court of Virginia is extremely reluctant to declare an entire stat-
ute unconstitutional. 226 But the court would not have to find the 
statute unconstitutional if the terms of section 1202(H) were nar-
row and well defined. Revising section 1202(H) would diminish 
the risk of unconstitutional decisions by Virginia courts. 
E. Equal Protection 
There are a number of equal protection problems with section 
1202(H). One of the most striking is that parents whose rights 
may be terminated under section 1202(H) are not notified of their 
right to counsel, nor are they appointed counsel if they are indi-
gent, but parents whose rights are on the line in section 63.2-
1203, for refusing consent, are.227 Virginia Code section 63.2-1203 
spells it out: 
In an adoption proceeding where the consent of a birth parent is re-
quired, but the petition for adoption alleges that the birth parent is 
withholding consent to the adoption, the court shall provide written 
notice to the birth parent of his right to be represented by counsel 
prior to any hearing or decision on the petition. Upon request, the 
court shall appoint counsel for any such birth parent if such parent 
has been determined to be indigent by the court pursuant to § 19.2-
159.22s 
In contrast, section 1202(H) has no such provision. 
There is no rational basis for treating parents who have alleg-
edly not contacted their children and parents who refuse to con-
224. Id. at 409, 411. 
225. Id. at 413. 
226. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
227. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1203 (Rep!. Vol. 2012), with id. § 63.2-1202(H) 
(Rep!. Vol. 2012). 
228. Id. § 63.2-1203(C) (Rep!. Vol. 2012). 
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sent differently. It could be argued that the parent who has 
abandoned a child is differently situated than one who refuses 
consent, because abandonment suggests a parent has not demon-
strated any interest in the child. But as discussed, abandonment 
is only alleged in section 1202(H) and may be the product of mul-
tiple factors, such as the restriction of visitation by the petitioner. 
Also, the parent who has been denied visitation can appear at the 
hearing and discredit the evidence of abandonment.229 But what 
about the parent who has not been personally served because af-
ter years of strained relations, the petitioner does not know, or 
claims not to know, where the parent is located? If she does not 
appear at the first hearing and no counsel is appointed, she has 
lost her one opportunity to be heard on the matter. She likely will 
be deemed unfit and her child will likely be adopted. 
Parents in termination of parental rights actions brought by 
the Virginia Department of Social Services are also appointed 
counsel if they are indigent. 230 These parents are situated differ-
ently than those fighting private adoptions; they have had their 
children removed and their familial privacy invaded by the state. 
But the potential result of the two types of termination proceed-
ings is the same: the state severs the legal relationship and all of 
the rights and responsibilities of the parent it previously recog-
nized. 
In fact, several jurisdictions have held that private adoption 
agencies act as the state for purposes of constitutional protec-
tions. 231 The Court of Appeals of Utah held in Swayne v. L.D.S. 
Social Services that an adoption agency's conduct in a private 
adoption constituted sufficient state action to warrant constitu-
tional protection because it is the state that cuts off the parental 
rights.232 The fact that the adoption agency received no state fund-
ing was immaterial to the analysis. 233 Ultimately it is the state, by 
the judiciary, that pierces the fundamental right of family priva-
229. Id. § 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
230. Id.§ 16.1-266(D) (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
231. See Appeal of H.R. (In re Baby Boy C.), 581 A.2d 1141, 1164 (D.C. 1990) (citing 
Scott v. Family Ministries, 135 Cal. Rptr. 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)) (noting that private 
adoption agencies are state actors under the Establishment Clause); see also Lugar v. Ed· 
mondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (finding state action when a deprivation is 
caused by the exercise of a right created by the state and the party can reasonably be de· 
fined as a state actor). 
232. 761 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
233. Id. at 936. 
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cy. The petitioner is simply making the case for the state to take 
action. 
This leads to another major equal protection problem. There 
are vast differences in the treatment of parents in public versus 
private adoptions in Virginia. Under federal law and Virginia 
law, the state must make reasonable efforts before and after re-
moving a child, and before filing a termination of parental rights, 
to preserve and restore the parent-child relationship. 234 There is 
no such mandate on any private person. In fact, it is the opposite. 
A private person has total control over the evidence-she can es-
sentially make the parent "unfit" in the eyes of the law by cutting 
off visitation and/or communication. She creates the grounds for 
waiver and no one can stop her. 
F. Conflict of Interest 
The equal protection issue regarding treatment of parents in 
public versus private adoptions hints at the fatal flaw of section 
1202(H): the inherent conflict of interest. The party who seeks to 
adopt the child holds all of the cards. The adoptive parent can 
make the natural parent "unfit" in the eyes of the law by restrict-
ing visits and demoralizing the natural parent to the point where 
she does not communicate with the adoptive family for six 
months. This is not to say that a biological parent is blameless if 
she fails to contact her child for six months, but the situation may 
be more complicated than it appears. This is well illustrated by 
many of the cases discussed in this article. Surely the legislature 
did not intend to create a statute, affecting the lives of children, 
which gives the adoptive parents every incentive to engage in un-
derhanded behavior. Section 1202(H) encourages hostility be-
tween parties and among families. 235 
Adoptions are so susceptible to conflicts that even in open, con-
sensual adoptions, in which the natural parent chooses to place 
her child for adoption and hand-picks the adoptive parents, most 
states forbid the same attorney to represent both sides, or at the 
234. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96·272, § 
471(a)(15)(A)-(B), 94 Stat. 501, 503 (1980); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. 
L. No. 105-89, § 10l(A)(15)(B)(i)-{ii), 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
281(A), (B) (Cum. Supp. 2013); id.§ 16.1·283(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
235. Many of the cases documented here involve custody arrangement and adoption 
petitions among family members (known as ''kinship adoptions"). 
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very least, strongly admonish against it.236 Virginia explicitly pro-
scribes dual representation in consensual adoptions.237 The Vir-
ginia State Bar recognized that the legal interests of a biological 
parent, who has chosen to give up her child, might still conflict 
with the legal interests of the parents she has selected. 238 If the 
Virginia State Bar can identify this potential conflict in adoptions 
that are by definition uncontested, surely Virginia lawmakers can 
understand why section 1202(H), as it now reads, is prone to mis-
use by parties and misinterpretation by the courts. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO AN INHERENTLY FLAWED STATUTE 
A. Recent Recognition of Parental Rights 
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently acknowledged the 
sanctity of the parent-child relationship and the potential con-
flicts in private adoptions in the infamous Wyatt v. McDermott 
case.
239 The majority found the allegations in Wyatt so "astonish-
ing and profoundly disturbing" that it recognized a cause of action 
for tortious interference with parental rights.240 The unmarried 
father, John Wyatt, alleged that he and the baby's mother had 
agreed to raise the child together but that, without his 
knowledge, the mother retained an attorney to arrange for an 
adoption.241 The mother's attorney worked with the mother to 
keep Wyatt "in the dark" about the adoption and to hide the birth 
from him. 242 After the birth, the mother transferred custody of the 
baby to a Utah couple without Wyatt's knowledge. 243 
236. See Pamela K. Strom Amlung, Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Independent 
Adoptions: Pitfalls for the Unwary, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 169, 178 (1990); Steven H. Hobbs, 
Family Matters: Nonwaivable Conflicts of Interest in Family Law, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
57, 68 (1998). 
237. VA. CODE ANN. L. ETHICS OP. 741 (Repl. Vol. 2002) ("The attorney may not, how-
ever, represent the adoptive parents ... and simultaneously undertake to represent the 
biological parent, even in the form of counseling in regard to anticipated inquiries from the 
court."); see also Hobbs, supra note 236, at 68. 
238. VA. CODE ANN. L. ETHICS OP. 741 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
239. 283 Va. 685, 692, 725 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2012). 
240. Id. at 703, 725 S.E.2d at 564. 
241. Id. at 689, 725 S.E.2d at 556. 
242. Id. at 689-90, 725 S.E.2d at 557. 
243. Id. at 690, 725 S.E.2d at 557. At the time of the Wyatt decision, custody and adop-
tion proceedings were still pending in Virginia and Utah. Id. at 690-91, 725 S.E.2d at 557. 
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Wyatt sued the adoption attorney in Utah, the adoption agen-
cy, an employee of the adoption agency, and the adoptive parents 
alleging multiple claims including tortious interference with pa-
rental rights.244 Answering a certified question from United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the Supreme 
Court of Virginia recognized a cause of action for tortious inter-
ference with parental rights if the complaining parent can prove: 
(1) a parental relationship with the minor child; (2) that a third 
party intentionally interfered with the parental relationship; (3) 
the interference caused harm; and (4) damages resulted from the 
inference.245 Potential damages for tortious interference with pa-
rental rights include not only the cost of securing the parent's 
rights but also mental anguish and lost companionship.246 
In another unusual and recent case, Layne v. Layne, the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia again acknowledged the public policy be-
hind strict construction of rights protecting the parent.247 In 
Layne, parents in a divorce action had agreed that the mother 
would "relinquishO her parental rights and any and all claims of 
parenthood to [the child]."248 The court of appeals held that par-
ents cannot terminate their own rights in a separation agree-
ment.249 
Parental rights are sacred, and it is against public policy to 
treat them lightly. Additionally, it is in the state's interest for 
children to have legal parents. Accordingly, the Virginia statutory 
scheme, primarily embodied in section 16.1-283, limits the cir-
cumstances for the constitutionally valid termination of residual 
parental rights. 250 That scheme "provides detailed procedures de-
signed to protect the rights of the parents and their child. These 
244. Id. at 691, 725 S.E.2d at 557. 
245. Id. at 699, 725 S.E.2d at 562 (quoting Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 765-66 
(W. Va. 1998)). 
246. Id. at 700, 725 S.E.2d at 563. 
247. 61 Va. App. 32, 37, 733 S.E.2d 139, 141 (2012) (quoting Church v. Church, 24 Va. 
App. 502, 508, 483 S.E.2d 498, 501 (1977)). 
248. Id. at 34, 733 S.E.2d at 140 (alterations in original). 
249. Id. at 37, 738 S.E.2d at 141. 
250. Id. at 36, 733 S.E.2d at 141 (citing Rader v. Montgomery Cnty. Dep't Servs., 5 Va. 
App. 523, 526, 365 S.E.2d 234, 235-36 (1988)). 
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procedures must be strictly followed before the courts are permit-
ted to sever the natural and legal bond between parent and 
child."251 
B. An Alternative that Achieves the True Intent of 1202(H) 
Perhaps Wyatt and Layne will give the legislature an incentive 
to reexamine section 1202(H). By enacting the 2012 amendment 
the legislature clarified that the intent of section 1202(H) is to 
terminate the rights of parents who are currently and consistent-
ly not showing an interest in or commitment to their children.252 
The parent must be unfit at the time the petition is filed. 253 So, for 
example, a parent who was absent during the child's infancy, but 
is now playing a role in his childhood, cannot have her consent to 
adoption unilaterally waived under the amended statute. This is 
an implicit acknowledgment by the legislature that familial rela-
tionships are fluid and that a minor may form an attachment 
with a parent at any point during childhood. Adding the parame-
ter of "six months immediately prior" suggests that the legisla-
ture wanted to reign in the definition of "failure to communicate" 
that had been used under section 1202(H) from its enactment in 
2006 to 2012.254 
As described in Part II, prior to 2006, the courts engaged in a 
much more nuanced analysis of "abandonment."255 This was ap-
propriate because as the vast body of case law across the country 
shows, there are an infinite number of circumstances which can 
appear to be "abandonment" but are actually much more compli-
cated.256 
There are valid reasons for Virginia to continue allowing pri-
vate adoptions, which dispense with the need for consent, even 
when the petitioning party has unilateral control over the proof of 
parental unfitness. The legal procedures that enable our children 
to have loving, stable homes should be as efficient as possible. 
251. Layne, 61 Va. App. at 36-37, 733 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting Rader v. Montgomery 
Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 5 Va. App. 523, 526 S.E.2d 234, 235-36 (1988)). 
252. See Act of Mar. 30, 2012, ch. 424, 2012 Va. Acts 721, 726 (codified as amended at 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2·1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012)). 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. See supra notes 125-47 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, legal permanency for a child is a valid reason for a 
court to simultaneously terminate parental rights and grant 
adoption in certain circumstances-for example, when a parent 
does not even know about his child or has displayed utter indif-
ference. 
But private adoptions which dispense with the need for paren-
tal consent would still be valid under the author's proposed stat-
ute. According to the proposal, a party who has cared for the child 
and has not been involved with the state's social services agency 
could still bring an adoption petition that waives the need for 
consent in some limited circumstances, including cases of actual 
abandonment, consistent and recent failure to contact the child, 
and if waiver is in the best interest of the child. 257 Moreover, it 
does not require courts to make any qualitative judgments on the 
nature of the contact. In other words, courts need not "evaluate 
the quality and value of time spent between a birth parent and 
child," as the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to do in 
Copeland.258 
Lawmakers should not be concerned that some adoptions will 
"fall through the cracks" under the author's proposed statute. If 
the criterion of the proposed section 1202(H) are not met, an 
adoptive parent can always bring a petition under section 63.2-
1205, alleging that the parent is withholding consent against the 
child's best interest. A parent who has made minimal contact 
with the child and has no bond with him or her will have an ex-
tremely difficult time justifying why she is withholding consent. 
This is illustrated by the vast body of case law granting adoptions 
under section 63.2-1205.259 
Based on analysis of the codes and case law of other states, the 
author proposes that the General Assembly rewrite Virginia Code 
section 63.2-1202(H) as follows. 
No consent shall be required of a birth parent who: 
(1) has willfully refused to contact, or 
(2) has made no attempt to contact, 
the child or the child's custodian(s); 
257. See infra text accompanying note 260. 
258. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra Part 11.B. 
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Notwithstanding the opportunity or ability to do so, for a 
period of six months immediately prior to the filing of the 
petition for adoption or the filing of a petition to accept con-
sent to an adoption; 
And where requiring such consent would be contrary to the 
best interest of the child. 
The prospective adoptive parent(s) shall establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that the birth parent(s), has will-
fully refused to contact or has not attempted to contact the 
child or the child's custodian for a period of six months im-
mediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption or 
the filing of a petition to accept consent to an adoption. The 
birth parent shall have the right to be noticed and heard on 
the allegation of lack of contact. The court shall provide 
written notice to the birth parent of his right to be repre-
sented by counsel, prior to any hearing or decision on the al-
legation of lack of contact. Upon request, the court shall ap-
point counsel for any such birth parent if such parent has 
been determined to be indigent by the court pursuant to § 
19.2-159.260 
The word "visit" is absent from the proposed statute. Allowing 
the prospective adoptive parents to make allegations about visita-
tion opens the door for misuse because it would be too easy to 
create evidence by not allowing the birth parent to visit. A cir-
cumstance like incarceration can also be misrepresented or mis-
construed to count against the birth parent's effort at visitation 
when it should not (recall the case described in the introduction of 
this article). 
The proposed statute achieves the legislature's goal of making 
adoption procedures efficient for children and prospective adop-
tive parents in cases where a birth parent does not deserve any 
say in the matter. But it does not do so at the expense of birth 
parents and children who do. 
260. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (retaining much of the lan-
guage of the current code while proposing revisions to what action, or inaction, is required 
to dispense with the need for parental consent). 
*** 
